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Consumer markets are quickly growing, creating the need to design new sales mechanisms. Here we
introduce a new auction model for selling products in real time and without production limitations.
Interested buyers continuously offer bids and if the price is “right”, the bid is accepted. The model
exhibits self-organized criticality; it presents a critical price from which a bid is accepted with
probability one, and avalanches of sales above this value are observed. We also discuss how to
implement the model and consider the impact of information sharing on total income, as well as the
impact of setting a base price.
PACS numbers: 05.65.+b, 87.10.-e, 87.23-n, 89.75-k, 02.50.Cw
I. INTRODUCTION
In certain situations, the act of buying and selling may
be considered an art. As we will see, special consider-
ations arise in cases where the buyer and seller share
no or minimal interaction. In an auction [1], the “true”
value of a product is unknown to the seller, and the sales
price is discovered during the course of open competitive
bidding. The most well-known auction mechanism is the
English auction. In this form of open ascending pricing
auction, the auctioneer calls out a low price for a single
or multi-item product and raises it until there is only
one interested buyer remaining. Traditionally used to
sell rare collectibles and antiques, nowadays auctions are
widely used with many types of products and services,
both in the traditional way (live) and on the Web (e.g.
Amazon and eBay). For example, Google, Microsoft, and
Yahoo! use auctions for search advertising and Amazon
uses an auction mechanism for selling computing time in
the Cloud.
Products or services may have a zero or non-zero
marginal cost (i.e., the cost of producing a single addi-
tional unit is zero). An important part of today’s economy
is based on doing business with products or goods that
have zero or almost zero marginal cost. Examples of these
products include adding a student to an online course,
selling one more mobile application, adding a Facebook
account, offering a new home on Airbnb, responding to a
new customer via a virtual agent, having a car in UBER,
and, in the future, analyzing a medical image using an
algorithm. Establishing the price of these products is not
trivial, and perhaps one of the most important tasks is
making the product known on the market. Just think of
a new useful mobile app: the selling price may be very
low or zero but it may be difficult for customers to find it
in a “sea of applications”.
Here we present an auction model for selling zero or non-
zero marginal cost products in an infinite stock system
∗Electronic address: dfraiman@udesa.edu.ar
that involves a certain degree of hurry in making the
decision if the bid is accepted.
II. THE MODEL
Let us suppose that the seller sells a product that has no
production limitation (i.e., infinity stock). For example, a
downloadable software or mobile application. In addition
to earning a profit, the company that sells this product
is interested in increasing its visibility in the marketplace
and earning shares when it faces competitors. Next, let
us suppose that each interested buyer can only make one
price offer, and that the decision to purchase must be
made with some degree of hurry. As an example, imagine
a customer who buys a computer without an operating
system (OS). This customer is interested in buying the
“A” OS so he/she offers a bid price for it. The company
that sells the “A” OS must quickly decide if they will sell
it at that price or whether the customer will never have
access to the “A” OS on that computer. This type of
customer appears all the time and the decision must be
made almost in real time. Our auction model takes these
conditions into account.
Buyers appear at different times, which are described by
some general stochastic process (e.g., an inhomogeneous
Poisson Process with rate λ(t), or any other). Once a
buyer appears, he/she offers a bid price for the product.
This value cannot be subsequently modified, and the
buyer cannot participate again in the buy-sell process.
The buyer does not know the bids made by the previous
interested buyers, as occurs in a blind auction. The seller
will sell the product to the buyer with the best bid, and
the transaction decision must occur almost in real time.
Let us suppose that the selling process starts at time
zero and buyers start to appear. The first potential buyer
(that appears at some arbitrary time t1) offers a value
X1 for the product; the second potential buyer offers X2,
and so on. The selling rule is the following: at each bid
appearance time, the highest remaining bid is executed,
except when the new bid exceeds this value. Whenever
this occurs, no transaction occurs and the new bid remains
in the bid queue until the time it becomes the highest
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2value. For example, let us suppose that the following bid
values were offered in this order:
14$, 15$
3
, 18$
1
, 13$, 16$
2
, 12$, 10$.
In this example, the first transaction occurs when the
fourth person (bid) appears. When he/she offers a price
of 13$ that is lower than the maximum at that time (18$),
the third transaction offering 18$ is executed. The fifth
bid value is the greatest value of the pending offers, which
is why no transaction is done at that moment. However,
this last bid is executed during the next bid appearance
time, when a smaller bid value of 12$ is presented. Finally,
the bid value of 15$ is executed because it turns out to
be the highest offer at the time the last bidder appears.
As we saw in this example, only the three largest offers
were executed. This sale process continues (up to infinity)
because new buyers appear continuously, and the main
goal is to understand how much money the company
will earn and how many products will be sold during a
given period of time. In particular, we are interested in
understanding what the stationary regime of this process
is.
As in any auction, the interested buyer makes an offer
based on his/her valuation of the product (based on the
demand for that product). Each bidder makes his/her own
valuation and ignores that of the other potential buyers.
Each participant offers a price valuation, X, that is well
described by a certain probability density function f(x)
with cumulative probability F (x). In this sales model, the
offered bids represent a sequence of independent random
variables X1, X2, X3, . . . , Xn, . . . with probability law
F . The key is to understand the consequences of the new
selling rule described above over this bid sequence.
A simple algorithm for this process is shown below.
x=randomF(1); # first price offered
y=vector(); # price of sold products
x˜=vector(); # remaining bids
x˜[1] = x;
k=1
for i in 2:N do
z = max(x);
out = find(x˜ == z) ; # index of the max bid
x = randomF (1) ; # ith-bid price
x˜ = c(x˜, x) ;
if x < z then
x˜ = x˜[−out] ;
y[k] = z ;
k=k+1;
end
end
Vector x˜ contains the remaining bids and vector y
contains the purchase prices of the accepted bids. The
Total Income earned by the company, TI, is described by,
TI =
N˜∑
k=1
Yk, (1)
where N˜ is the random variable number of sales when N
interested parties have made offers.
Next, we show that at some time long after the start
of the auction, let us say when N >> 1 interested buyers
have made their bids, an average of (1 − pc)N bidders
will have made a purchase,
〈N˜〉 = (1− pc)N, (2)
and each one has paid a value greater than a value xc
which verifies
F (xc) = pc, (3)
with [10]
pc ≈ e−1. (4)
Moreover, the expected total income earned by the com-
pany will be
〈TI〉 = N
∫ ∞
xc
xf(x)dx. (5)
For example, if we suppose that the bid price distribution
f(x) is exponential, with a rate of λ, f(x) = λe−λx, then
the mean total income is (xc + 1/λ)e
−λxc with xc =
− 1λ ln(1− pc). It is straightforward to compute the mean
TI for other price distributions such as Log-Normal, or
heavy tail Power Law with α > 2. The case α > 2 is
discussed in the Discussion section.
The behavior described above arises because the auction
process leads to a situation where most of the remaining
offers become “frozen” and are never executed (because
the offered prices are low) and only a very small number
of the remaining offers (called “active”), will be executed
in the near future. Figure 1 (A) shows 1,000 bids, in
the order they appeared, for the sale process with a Log-
Normal price distribution. The red filled circles are the
accepted bids and the black circles are the remaining
ones. Note that there is a sharp cut between the price
of accepted versus not accepted bids. The cutoff appears
at a critical price xc (represented by a dashed line) that
verifies eq. 3. The right price histogram enhances the
distribution of accepted versus not accepted bids.
Importantly, after a short period of time, the mean
number of active bids does not continue to grow. That
is why the probability density function of the remaining
or frozen offered prices g(x˜), in the limit of N going to
infinity, converges to
g(x˜) =
{
1
F (xc)
f(x˜) if x ≤ xc
0 if x > xc.
(6)
3Thus, the complement of the remaining offers, the sales
prices, Y , have a probability density function, h(y), de-
scribed by
h(y) =
{
0 if y ≤ xc
1
1−F (xc)f(y) if y > xc.
(7)
The remaining price distribution (g(x˜)) for the previous
example is depicted in Fig. 1 in grey and the distribution
of the accepted prices (h(y)) is depicted in red. Note that
there is a clear cutoff even for as few as 1,000 bidders.
Now that we have calculated the accepted bid distri-
bution, it is straightforward to obtain the mean Total
Income per bid in the limit of N going to infinity,
lim
N→∞
1
N
〈TI〉 =
∫ ∞
xc
yf(y)dy. (8)
So far we have shown that if N is very large, the mean TI
can reach N
∫∞
xc
yf(y)dy. But, what about the variance
of TI? How does it grow with N? The variance verifies
lim
N→∞
1
N
Var (TI) = af , (9)
where af is a number that depends on the price distribu-
tion (f). This behavior is good because for large N values,
it scales linear with N which is not much variability. af
can be computed in a empirical way. Nevertheless, as
we will see a first order approximation can be done for
obtaining a quick estimation of af . The total income is
a random sum of independent random variables (eq. 1).
Therefore, if we calculate the variance as if N˜ and the
Yk sequence were independent (which is not the case) we
find that
Var (TI) = 〈N˜〉Var (Y ) + 〈Y 〉2Var
(
N˜
)
. (10)
Finally, using eq. 2 and the empirical fact that for large
N the Var
(
N˜
)
goes as bN with b ≈ 0.0383 (see [11] Fig.
Supp. 1), we obtain that
lim
N→∞
1
N
Var (TI) = (1− pc)Var (Y ) + b〈Y 〉2 ≈ af . (11)
Therefore, as a first order approximation the asymptotic
TI variance can be calculated (from eq. 7 and 11) once
the price distribution is known. The empirical af for the
previous example sale process with a Log-Normal price
distribution is 0.093, and the given by eq.11 is equal to
0.102 (see Supp. Fig. 3).
Figure 1 (B) shows the TI behavior as a function of
the number of bidders. The empirical interval TI ±
3
√
V ar(TI) from 200 simulations is shown in red. More
than 99% of the simulations fall within this interval [12]
The black line corresponds to the (theoretical) mean value
TI given by eq. 5. Equation 8 describes the Total Income
per bid for large times (N >> 1) after the start of the sale
process. Equation 5, on the other hand, is written for fixed
N ; although N must be large, as mentioned earlier, it is
interesting to note the extent to which the description
is good for small N . A close-up of Fig. 1 for smaller
values of N is shown in the inset of Fig. 1. This graphic
highlights the non-linear behavior at the beginning of the
sales process, particularly when the number of bidders is
less than 50. For N larger than 50, eq. 5 yields a good
approximation. The same happens when we compare the
empirical TI variance with the theoretical variance, given
by eq. 11 (Var (TI) = afN). There is some difference
between both variances for N < 50, and this difference is
negligible for larger N values (see Fig. Supp. 3).
The model presented here and its asymptotic behavior
resembles the Bak-Sneppen model [5–8]. In this well-
known and elegant model, the number of species N (in
our case the number of bidders) is fixed, and the model
is studied at the thermodynamic limit (N → ∞); the
common limit in statistical physics. In our case, we have
a growing model where the number of bidders goes to
infinity. But, is this sales model a self-organized criticality
model as is the Bak-Sneppen model? Self-organized criti-
cality processes are characterized by stationary regimes
that present avalanches. Are there avalanches in the sales
model? Avalanches do in fact exist in the model presented
here. If one studies the number of consecutive sales, τ ,
above xc (or the number of sales between two successive
purchases below price xc), a power law behavior is ob-
served (see Fig. 2). Above we said that all purchases are
above xc, but this is not exactly true. A few purchases
are around or slightly below xc. However, the number
of these purchases is negligible (when N → ∞), which
is why we previously considered them as nonexistent for
large N . They are negligible because the mean duration
of a sales avalanche, 〈τ〉, is infinity due to the heavy tail
behavior of τ (P (τ > k) ∼ k−0.54).
III. MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION
Let X1, X2, X3, . . . be the sequence of bid prices in the
order they appear. As is true of all auctions, some offers
are effective, some will be effective in the future, and
others will never be effective. Let Y1, Y2, Y3, . . . be the
prices of the effective transactions. This sequence is a
subsequence of the X sequence and can be described as
follows: Let us define
1. The set of the first k bid prices accepted,
Θk = {Y1;Y2; . . . ;Yk}.
2. The sequence of remaining bids,
X˜j,k = Xj1{Xj /∈Θk}.
3. The maximun remaining bid,
4FIG. 1: (A) The auction process for a Log-Normal price
distribution, f(x) = 1
xσ
√
2pi
e
− (ln(x)−µ)
2
2σ2 , with µ = 0 and σ =
0.3 is shown. The offered prices (bids) are shown for each
of 1,000 bidders in the order they appear. The accepted
bids are shown with red filled circles, and the remaining bids
with black circles. The critical price xc (F (xc) = pc = e
−1
and therefore xc ≈ 0.90371) is shown with a dashed line.
A histogram of the bid values is shown on the right. (B)
An empirical 95% confidence interval is shown for the Total
Income (TI) in red. Two-hundred simulations were made
and the the interval average ± 3 standard deviation is shown.
The theoretical value 〈TI〉 is shown with a black line (〈TI〉 =∫∞
xc
yf(y)dyN = 0.7720651N). In the inset we show a close-up
of the first values together with the theoretical value.
X˜maxk (t) = max{X˜1,k; X˜2,k; . . . ; X˜t,k}
The accepted n− th bid verifies
Yn = Xkn , (12)
with
kn =argmax
1≤j≤hn
X˜j,n−1
hn =min{h > kn−1 + 1 : X˜maxn−1 (h) = X˜maxn−1 (h+ 1)}.
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FIG. 2: Avalanche distribution. The probability that the
duration of a sales avalanche (of prices larger than xc) is
greater than an arbitrary value k as a function of k, P (τ > k).
The red line corresponds to a robust fit of the tail distribution
in the range of 100 < k < 10000. The estimated slope is
−0.54 ± 0.05. The tail of the distribution decays abruptly
near to 100000 because there is a finite size scaling problem.
Simulations were done for a number of bidders (N) equal to
2000000.
Let N˜(k) be the number of accepted bids when k bids
have been offered. This value evolves in the following
way:
N˜(k + 1) =
{
N˜(k) if Xk+1 ≥ X˜maxN˜(k)(k)
N˜(k) + 1 if Xk+1 < X˜
max
N˜(k)
(k),
(13)
with N˜(1) = 0. The critical value can be obtained by
taking the following limit
lim
N→∞
〈N˜(N)〉
N
= 1− pc, (14)
and the asymptotic variance can be calculated in a similar
way,
lim
N→∞
Var
(
N˜(N)
)
N
= b ≈ 0.0383. (15)
An avalanche is a sequence of events where the accepted
bid values are greater than xc. It starts at k+1 if Yk < xc
and Yk+1 > xc, and has a duration τ if Yk+2 > xc, Yk+3 >
xc,...,Yk+τ > xc, and Yk+τ+1 ≤ xc. The τ distribution
displays an asymptotic behavior (for large s),
P (τ = s) ∼ s−α or P (τ > s) ∼ s−α+1, (16)
with α ≈ 1.5, and therefore 〈τ〉 =∞.
5IV. MODIFICATIONS OF THE MODEL
The model may be modified to have a different critical
value and similar dynamics. For example, a bid would
be accepted if it is the highest bid compared with those
presented before and after it two consecutive. This last
model yields a critical value pc ≈ 0.5.
Another modification of the original model may be to
use the same rule and add the possibility for bidders to
drop out of the auction after a given period of time. This
modification makes the model more complex, but it also
presents a self-organized criticality behavior. This model
exceeds the scope of this paper and will be presented
elsewhere.
V. DISCUSSION
Herein we have introduced a novel model for selling
zero or non-zero marginal cost products in real time. This
model exhibits self-organized criticality [9]. The model
can be applied for selling any product that has infinity
stock or products that can be produced at the same (or
similar) rate of the demand, for example, for selling online
publicity, electronic posters, software, etc. In the model
for almost all bids, the decision is made quickly and the
acceptance price is above a (critical) value xc that only
depends on the bid price distribution. Approximately
63.2%, or exactly (1− e−1)100%, of the bidders will buy
the product (bids accepted). This value may be modified
by slightly altering the model, as we have shown. One
of the advantages of the model is that the average total
income can be estimated with high accuracy.
We believe this model may motivate quantitative re-
searchers to further explore this topic. As a result, new
economic models may emerge for situations where there
is little or no interaction between the economic agents.
On the following subsection we discuss some consid-
erations for the implementation of the model, and some
relevant questions to the field of behavioral economics:
what is the impact of information sharing in the model?
What is the empirical price distribution? Is it convenient
to set a base price?
A. Considerations for the implementation of the
model
One important consideration for implementing the
model is that each interested buyer must apply to the auc-
tion process through a unique bid, as in closed envelope
tenders. Therefore, in practice, it is necessary to verify
bidder identities, which is not a difficult problem. One
might ask, why not sell to everyone who makes an offer
(instead of defining an auction mechanism), as the band
RadioHead did 10 years ago? The band sold their album
In Rainbows using a “pay what you want” method, which
proved to be a success. In terms of bids, this means that
all the offered prices were accepted. The key point is that
under this hypothesis, if we define the sequence of “sure
bids”, Xsure1 , X
sure
2 , X
sure
3 , . . . , these bids probably will
be very different (fsure(x) 6= f(x)). It is reasonable to
suppose that Xsure will be smaller than the value X of
the auction model presented here because there is no risk
of not obtaining the product (i.e. probably Xsure ≤
st
X),
which is equivalent to saying that its corresponding cu-
mulative distributions will verify F sure(x) ≥ F (x) for all
x. Therefore, the total income will most likely be smaller
with the “pay what you want” (or donation) option, yet
this method has the advantage of socializing the product.
1. The price distribution
Clearly, the bidder behavior is influenced by his income,
the opportunities presented by the economic environment,
the valuation of the product, and the auction rule, among
other things. That is why bidders presents different bids.
If we choose randomly one of the bidders, she/he will
make an offer that is describe a random variable X with
distribution F (x). The profit depends on this last distri-
bution. We cannot advocate for any one price distribution
over another, but suggest that novel products or services
would have an exponential or power law distribution,
while products that are well-known on the market would
have a Normal or Log-Normal distribution. It is interest-
ing to note that if the price distribution has a a power
law tail with α < 2 the expected total income is infinity,
which means in practice that could be arbitrary large.
Is there a universal price distribution for novel products,
for example? In other words, is the law the same for all
products except for a scale factor? One way to deter-
mine this is to use the model on real sales. Behavioral
experiments could help answer this question if the true
motivation for obtaining the product is controlled, which
is difficult. Finally, an additional thing to consider is the
wealth distribution in a given population, which would
reflect that population’s economic capacity for buying the
product. This may “mix” the “true” price distribution of
a homogeneous population. Perhaps all of these factors
together result in a heavy tail distribution. It would be
interesting to conduct studies in different countries (i.e.,
using different GPS coefficients).
2. Targeting prices
With additional information about the bidders, one
can categorize them according to country, sex, age, and
any other relevant sociodemographic variable. Bidders
could compete with other bidders from the same economic
segment, which would yield more equity opportunities
for acquiring the product. The (1− pc)100% most inter-
ested targeted buyers (based on the bids) will obtain the
product.
63. Base price or not?
The same auction procedure may be applied with a
base price. In this case, the bids received (X) will be
larger than the base price. Companies that sell non-zero
products may be tempted to use a base price. Is this
a good strategy? Will the profit be larger? This is not
an easy question to answer. Once again, this most likely
depends on the novelty of the product. However, setting
a base price may have a priming effect, a phenomenon
well-known to the cognitive neuroscience and behavioral
economics communities. In priming [3, 4], exposure to
one stimulus influences a response to a subsequent stimu-
lus without conscious guidance or intention. How much
awareness the bidder has regarding the priming effect on
his/her bid value is a matter of debate.
l
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FIG. 3: Bid prices for each of the experimental conditions.
Each base price is shown with a red dashed line.
To further explore this matter, we conducted an experi-
ment using a rudimentary protocol. Eighty-one university
students were asked to make a bid for a new product that
significantly improves memory. The specific question was:
“How much would you pay to use this product for 1 hour
a day for 2 years?” All students, except two, showed
interest to purchase the product. Details about the prod-
uct and questionnaire are described in Supp. Mat. Each
subject was randomly assigned to one of three groups.
In group 1, students make a bid to obtain the service;
in group 2, students make a bid with a pre-established
cheap base price; and in group 3, students make a bid
with a pre-established larger base price. Figure 3 shows
a boxplot of the bid prices for each group in log-scale
together with the base price (dashed lines). As shown
in Fig. 3, the larger the base price, the higher the bids.
Moreover, “no base price” yields similar bids than low
base prices. Note that subjects who consider the base
price high offer lower bids.
4. What about information sharing?
Here we discuss and speculate what would happen if the
purchase price distribution is known by the new interested
buyers. Let us suppose that after some time, when the
process has stabilized, the company decides to share the
purchase price distribution (i.e., a histogram with all the
sales conducted until that moment). Alternatively (and
perhaps more realistically), buyers who purchased the
product share their purchase price on some webpage or
social network that is accessible by new potential buyers.
How would this influence the bids of future bidders? We
believe this could lead to a surprising effect: a new critical
price xnewc will appear, which will be larger than the
previous one (xc). This will happen because most of
the accepted bids will be greater than xc, and thus a
new customer interested in the product will offer a value
greater than xc, thus pushing the critical price to a larger
value. How sharing information changes the rest of the
original price distribution is a mystery. Note that even
when xnewc is greater than xc and the rate of bidders
is equal, the new total income TInew may be smaller
or larger than the previous one (TI). The value TInew
depends on the details of the new price distribution, Fnew.
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